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DocumentMS

Glossary

Two-factor authentication

Also called: 2FA, MFA, multi-factor authentication

Two-factor authentication requires a second proof of identity beyond a password, typically a time-based code or a hardware key. In a document system it is the control that makes a stolen password insufficient, which matters because passwords are the most commonly compromised credential.

Two-factor authentication explained

Which factors are worth requiring

Time-based one-time codes from an authenticator application are the practical baseline: widely supported, no per-user cost, and resistant to password reuse and credential stuffing.

Hardware security keys are stronger because they resist phishing — a code can be relayed to an attacker in real time, a key cannot. For roles with administrative authority over a document estate, they are worth the friction.

SMS codes are better than nothing and weaker than both, because SIM swapping and interception are practical attacks. Where a regulator or an insurer specifies "multi-factor", it is worth checking whether SMS satisfies them.

Enforcing it per role

Blanket enforcement is simplest and creates friction for occasional readers. Per-role enforcement is a reasonable compromise: require it for anyone who can approve, administer, change permissions or export, and leave read-only roles to organisational policy.

What matters is that the requirement is a system-enforced setting rather than a documented expectation, because the latter is not a control.

Where it sits with single sign-on

If authentication is federated, the second factor is enforced at the identity provider and the document system inherits it. That is the right place for it — but confirm it is actually enforced there rather than assuming, because an unenforced identity provider policy protects nothing.

FAQ

Two-factor authentication: common questions

Should we require 2FA for every user?

For anyone who can approve, administer or export, yes. For occasional read-only users it is a judgement about friction against risk, and the answer depends on how sensitive the repository is.

What about shared or service accounts?

Shared accounts should not exist in a document system — they defeat attribution, which is the foundation of every audit control. Service accounts should use scoped API keys rather than user credentials.

A 30-minute session with a solutions engineer, using a folder structure and approval chain that resemble yours — not a generic demo tenant.