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DocumentMS

Glossary

Two-factor authentication

Also called: 2FA, MFA, multi-factor authentication

Two-factor authentication requires a second proof of identity beyond a password, typically a time-based code or a hardware key. In a document system it is the control that makes a stolen password insufficient, which matters because passwords are the most commonly compromised credential.

Two-factor authentication explained

Which factors are worth requiring

Time-based one-time codes from an authenticator application are the practical baseline: widely supported, no per-user cost, and resistant to password reuse and credential stuffing.

Hardware security keys are stronger because they resist phishing — a code can be relayed to an attacker in real time, a key cannot. For roles with administrative authority over a document estate, they are worth the friction.

SMS codes are better than nothing and weaker than both, because SIM swapping and interception are practical attacks. Where a regulator or an insurer specifies "multi-factor", it is worth checking whether SMS satisfies them.

Enforcing it per role

Blanket enforcement is simplest and creates friction for occasional readers. Per-role enforcement is a reasonable compromise: require it for anyone who can approve, administer, change permissions or export, and leave read-only roles to organisational policy.

What matters is that the requirement is a system-enforced setting rather than a documented expectation, because the latter is not a control.

Where it sits with single sign-on

If authentication is federated, the second factor is enforced at the identity provider and the document system inherits it. That is the right place for it — but confirm it is actually enforced there rather than assuming, because an unenforced identity provider policy protects nothing.

FAQ

Two-factor authentication: common questions

Should we require 2FA for every user?

For anyone who can approve, administer or export, yes. For occasional read-only users it is a judgement about friction against risk, and the answer depends on how sensitive the repository is.

What about shared or service accounts?

Shared accounts should not exist in a document system — they defeat attribution, which is the foundation of every audit control. Service accounts should use scoped API keys rather than user credentials.

Uma sessão de 30 minutos com um engenheiro de soluções, sobre uma estrutura de pastas e uma cadeia de aprovação parecidas com as suas — não um ambiente de demonstração genérico.